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Abstract
Increasingly, there is concern about the problem and potential consequences of counterfeit parts in the defense supply chain and 
defense systems.  Counterfeit parts have different performance and failure characteristics than genuine parts and can result in 
degraded system availability, reliability and performance in the field, not to mention critical safety issues.  Thus, there is an 
imperative to understand counterfeiting and potential ways to prevent or contain it.  Today’s systems are composed of multitudes 
of constituents – major sub-systems, which in turn consist of sub-systems, which consist of components, and so on.  Likewise, 
the supply chain consists of multiple tiers of suppliers who provide the constituents.  This is a complex environment in which to 
address the counterfeit parts problem.  In addition, counterfeiters can potentially adapt to and overcome anti-counterfeiting 
measures, and non-counterfeiting actors may adapt to such measures in unanticipated ways, causing secondary effects.  This 
paper presents an enterprise modeling framework for studying the problem. This framework consists of five interacting elements 
– the exogenous environment, policy, enterprise actors, supply chain flows, and system/constituent behavior and performance.  A
prototype agent-based simulation model implementing this framework is also presented.  The goal is to use such models to 
determine effective anti-counterfeiting policies.
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1. Introduction
Increasingly, military systems are being infiltrated by counterfeit parts.  Recent years have seen reports of 
counterfeit parts intended for various systems, including planes, helicopters and submarines.  Such counterfeit parts 
are typically not original to the system, but rather are replacements purchased for use in the sustainment phase of 
system operation via the supply chain.  Defense supply chains are complex, with thousands of suppliers, numerous 
tiers of organization, and a multitude of relationships between suppliers.  A supplier may provide a component that is 
used in a minor sub-system made by another supplier, which in turn is used in a major sub-system from a different 
supplier.  Most counterfeit parts identified thus far are electronic components (e.g., integrated circuits), rather than 
sub-systems. Once embedded into a sub-system, electronic counterfeits can be difficult to detect.
Counterfeit parts have different performance and failure characteristics than genuine parts and can result in 
degraded system availability, reliability and performance, not to mention critical safety issues.  In addition, 
counterfeits damage the reputation and intellectual property of legitimate suppliers, especially in research-intensive 
industries.  Thus, there is an imperative to understand counterfeiting and ways in which it can be addressed.
One way in which to study and address the counterfeiting problem is to create a model of the phenomena and 
analyze potential solutions to it in terms of their effectiveness.  Using a traditional engineering approach, one might 
perform trade-off analysis between the cost of solutions versus their effectiveness.  Likewise, one might develop a 
simulation model of the supply chain that delivers parts with the goal of designing inspection points for counterfeits.
However, such traditional engineering approaches are limited in their effectiveness because they do not capture 
the socio-technical nature of the problem.  For instance, suppliers and counterfeiters react to information and risk.  If 
a supplier is held liable for counterfeits that infiltrate its sub-systems, it may reduce its participation in defense work.  
Less reliable suppliers may take its place, increasing the likelihood of counterfeit infiltration.   On the other hand, a 
counterfeiter may adapt and switch strategies in response to risk.  Such phenomena occur commonly in the emerging 
field of enterprise modeling and analysis, where economic and social influences affect system behavior, performance 
and outcomes, along with technical considerations1,2.  Adaptive behavior often causes unintended consequences and 
secondary effects.  Due to the importance of socio-technical effects and adaptive behavior, we seek to model the 
counterfeit parts problem in an enterprise context, where a variety of organizations perform different roles in the 
development and operation of complex systems.
Now, it may be the case that multiple modeling formalisms are needed to capture the different phenomena present 
in an enterprise. This may present technical challenges from a modeling perspective, since different assumptions and 
levels of resolution may result in conflicts between formalisms.  Recently, Pennock and Rouse3 have advanced a 
methodology for enterprise modeling that addresses such model composition challenges.  This paper explores the 
application of that methodology to the counterfeit parts problem in an enterprise context.  In particular, we focus on 
counterfeit electronics, since those are of primary concern.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the problem of counterfeit parts.  This 
problem is discussed in an enterprise context in Section 3, and an existing enterprise modeling methodology is 
applied to it.  Section 4 presents an enterprise modeling framework and an associated computational model.  Section 
5 concludes and presents future research.
2. The Counterfeit Parts Problem
Counterfeiting is an age-old problem.  Historically, counterfeiters produced either counterfeit goods or 
counterfeit money.  The party receiving such goods or money could inspect the end-product to determine whether it 
was counterfeit.  In the systems domain, though, counterfeiting has manifested itself differently, with an increasing 
production of and trade in counterfeit parts, or components of end-products such as airplanes, submarines or 
missiles.  Thus, one cannot simply inspect the end-product system to determine whether a component is counterfeit.  
Counterfeit components typically are not inserted into new systems, since the original systems integrator takes care 
that all parts are supplied by an original component or equipment manufacturer (OCM/OEM).  Rather, they are 
inserted as replacement parts as systems age.  The biggest risk comes from obsolete parts no longer available from 
OCMs/OEMs.  A counterfeit component may be embedded within several layers of sub-systems, making it difficult 
to detect when a sub-system is purchased for installation into an overall system.
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Concern centers around two types of counterfeiting – fraudulent counterfeits and malicious counterfeits.  
Fraudulent counterfeits derive from the traditional motivation of a counterfeiter to make a profit through fraud, by 
substituting an inferior product that is inexpensively produced relative to the cost of the genuine article.  These 
counterfeits fall into several categories.  Some parts are re-marked to appear as OCM/OEM.  Defective parts can 
passed as good OCM/OEM parts.  Additionally, parts can be removed from scrapped assemblies and passed as new.  
Malicious counterfeits are designed to appear to perform correctly, but then malfunction at critical times or open 
security breaches so that adversaries gain advantage.  Guin et al.4 detail a more complete taxonomy of counterfeit 
electronics, as well as counterfeit detection methods. 
Concerns about counterfeit parts, in particular electronics, have been aired for almost a decade5,6,7,8,9,10.
Numerous contributing socio-technical factors have influenced the increased occurrence of counterfeiting:
x Increased system complexity;
x Globalization of commerce and supply chains, especially in semiconductors and electronics;
x Globalization of DoD programs, causing inducements to use foreign suppliers;
x Outsourcing of design and manufacturing of major sub-systems by primes;
x Sub-system obsolescence caused by extended lifespan of systems and diminishment of OCMs/OEMs providing 
replacement parts over the lifecycle horizon (replaced by potentially unreliable independent distributors)6;
x Weak IP protection outside of U.S.;
x Increasing sophistication of design and manufacturing technology used by counterfeiters;
x Use of internet as a purchasing platform and its relatively anonymous nature11;
x State subsidy, influence or control of potential foreign suppliers; and
x Decreased cost of counterfeits vs. genuine articles (e.g., movement toward environmentally-friendly electronics 
that are more expensive to produce).
The Department of Defense (DoD), in conjunction with industry, is developing a number of strategies, policies 
and guidelines aimed at addressing the counterfeit parts problem.  Many of these are new or under development; 
thus, it is not known how successful they will be.  A summary of efforts includes:
x Acquisition regulations addressing supplier qualification, suspect counterfeit reporting, supplier penalties for 
counterfeits and pass-throughs12;
x Use of a secure trusted foundry network of suppliers to reverse engineer and produce obsolete parts;
x Testing regimens to detect counterfeits at entry points in supply chain13;
x Traceability of components throughout traversal of supply chain6;
x Criticality analysis under Program Protection Plans to focus on parts/sub-systems deemed critical to mission;
x Industry standards for supplier qualification14;
x Obsolescence management and re-engineering obsolete sub-systems; and
x Law enforcement to identify and remove counterfeiters.
The critical question is what set of these strategies, policies and guidelines are best to address the counterfeiting 
problem, taking into account cost, effectiveness and the adaptive behavior of suppliers and counterfeiters.  For 
example, test and detection is a standard methodology applied to identification of non-conforming product.  
However, as Cohen and Lee15 observe, obsolete parts are most vulnerable to counterfeiting, and these tend to have 
small lot sizes.  They demonstrate that this works against the statistical effectiveness of standard test procedures.  In 
addition, standard procedures can result in numerous false positives, not just identification of counterfeits (true 
positives).  Testing itself can be quite expensive, and the cost of discarded good product from false positives 
increases the cost of a testing program significantly.  
Another approach involves qualifying suppliers to those most likely to provide products without counterfeits.  Of 
course, restricting suppliers tends to increase cost.  Similarly, imposing penalties on suppliers who pass counterfeits 
even unknowingly or disallowing costs to remediate counterfeits can restrict the number of suppliers.  
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Finally, there are a number of trade-offs to be considered, such as the extent of those sub-systems deemed critical 
and the frequency with which sub-systems are re-engineered.  Increasing the number of critical sub-systems or 
frequency of re-engineering reduces risk from counterfeit infiltration, but increases cost.
3. Enterprise Modeling for Counterfeit Parts
Enterprises are complex and may require different perspectives and formalisms for modeling.  Pennock and 
Rouse3 have proposed a methodology for modeling enterprises that includes evaluation steps for model composition 
should different formalisms be needed in modeling a particular enterprise problem.  This methodology has ten steps 
with potential iteration between them, and it starts with model concepting and design, and then progresses to 
implementation and validation.  In this section, we primarily address the application of the first six steps of this 
methodology (i.e., model design) to the counterfeit parts problem.  This work has been assisted significantly by a 
series of roundtable discussions with subject matter experts in counterfeiting in DoD systems.
The first step in the methodology is to decide on the central question of interest.  The key question here is to 
determine an effective set of policies along multiple metrics to minimize adverse effects of counterfeit parts while 
accounting for adaptive behavior.  There may not be one single policy that will address the problem.  In addition, 
there is not one single decision point in the enterprise, so multiple actors have say over different policies.  Thus, the 
question seeks a set of policies.  This central question involves multiple questions at a lower level of detail explored 
in a set of trade-offs in a subsequent step.  The next step is to define key phenomena underlying these questions 
(Table 1).
Table 1. Key phenomena underlying questions
Category Phenomena
Operational systems & 
constituents
Work breakdown structures (major & minor sub-systems, components, etc.); vulnerabilities of system 
designs to counterfeiting; Mission profiles; System performance criteria (technical performance, 
availability, lifecycle cost, reliability and security); Nominal system performance vs. counterfeit-
induced performance; Maintenance and repair schedules; Technology upgrade policies and schedules; 
Configuration management; System characteristics over lifecycle; Counterfeit parts.
Supply chain flows Globalized nature of DoD supply chain; Programs and supplier networks; Trusted Foundry network; 
Evolution of part flows over program lifecycle; Counterfeiting networks.
Enterprise actors Programs and suppliers; Supplier behavior and adaptation; Supplier diminishment; DoD agencies 
(systems engineering, logistics & materiel readiness, policy); Law enforcement; Counterfeiter 
motivations and capabilities; Counterfeiter risk and incentive behavior; Counterfeiter adaptation.
Policy Extent of criticality analysis; Prevalence of testing; Use of tracking/traceability; Supplier qualification; 
Supplier penalties and disallowed costs; Obsolescence management; Law enforcement approach.
Exogenous environment Technological progress over program lifecycle; Technology off-shoring; Threat profiles.
Step 3 involves developing visualizations of relationships among key phenomena.  Due to space limitations here, 
the reader is referred to a previous report16 that provides key visualizations for the eco-system (exogenous 
environment, policies and relations with key elements of other categories in Table 1), the enterprise actors and their 
relationships, and delivery operations (combining the supply chain flows and operational systems).  In step 4, 
potential trade-offs are outlined for further analysis (Table 2).  It is important to note that the model is not to be 
designed around these trade-offs.  Step 5 calls for identifying alternative representations of phenomena (Table 3).
Step 6 addresses linkages of different modeling formalisms.  Primarily, the representations are agent-based.  
These discrete models operate via time-step advance.  A system dynamics model of the exogenous environment can 
interoperate with them via such simulation platforms as AnyLogic™, where both formalisms are supported in 
underlying Java™.  The key is to design the interaction so that it is computationally efficient and scalable.  For 
instance, such interactions can occur via condition-checking (e.g., a continuous system dynamics variable reaches a
particular value and triggers an agent event).  Such condition-checking may need to occur at each time-step.  
Therefore, careful selection and design of condition-checking protocols is needed.
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Table 2. Potential trade-offs
Trade-offs
What is the trade-off between the scope of liability and penalties for counterfeiting (including allowing pass-through counterfeits in 
sub-systems and systems) versus supplier availability across the program lifecycle?
What is the trade-off between limiting foreign and/or non-trusted suppliers and the availability and cost of replacement parts in a 
restricted market?
What is the trade-off between results of incrementally putting counterfeiters out of business, tolerating continued counterfeits and 
possibly enabling adaptation vs. waiting to put a network out of business?
In defining critical sub-systems, what is the trade-off between the scope of the definition of criticality (i.e., wide versus narrow) 
and the resources needed to address that scope and performance impacts caused by that scope?
What is the trade-off between the effectiveness of supply chain inspections for counterfeits versus costs of testing programs 
(including false positives) and delays caused by them?
What is the trade-off involving cost and risk between stockpiling replacement parts (life-time buy) vs. re-engineering for new parts 
vs. sourcing from trusted foundry vs. buying obsolete parts?
Table 3. Representations for phenomena
Phenomena Representation
Operational systems & 
constituents
Agent-based model with constituents modeled as attribute objects in an object-oriented framework and 
with operational behaviors modeled via state-charts.  Cohorts modeled rather than individual systems.
Supply chain flows Either agent-based model of systems and constituent with locations and flows modeled via state-charts 
and attributes, or process-based discrete-event model with entities linked to agents representing 
systems and constituents.  Supply network and counterfeiter network modeled to evolve over time.
Enterprise actors Agent-based model with actors modeled as complex agents and relationships modeled by arcs 
(synchronized with supply chain flows for supplier relationships).  Economic models embedded within 
agents to model supplier and counterfeiter adaptation.
Policy Global variables set by analyst with an associated agent-based model to enable policy adaptation.
Exogenous environment System dynamics model representing trends in technology progress, technology off-shoring.
The remaining steps of the methodology are not addressed in this paper.  However, they include the following 
steps:
x Step 7: Determine a consistent set of assumptions
x Step 8: Identify data sets to support parameterization
x Step 9: Program and verify computational instantiations
x Step 10: Validate model predictions, at least against baseline data
4. Enterprise Modeling Framework and Computational Model for Counterfeit Parts
The results from the application of the enterprise modeling methodology are being developed into an enterprise 
modeling framework and associated computational model for counterfeit parts.  This work will complete the 
application of the enterprise modeling methodology to the counterfeit parts problem in terms of consistent 
assumptions and representations across different formalisms, data parameterization, implementation and 
verification, and validation.  The framework is shown in Fig. 1.
430   Douglas A. Bodner /  Procedia Computer Science  36 ( 2014 )  425 – 431 
Fig. 1. Enterprise modeling framework
The exogenous model is represented by the simplified systems dynamics causal diagram.  Key variables 
influence the actor, supply chain and system models.  For instance, an increasing system life trend increases the 
deployed lifetime of systems in the operational systems model.  Similarly, technology progression impacts the 
generation of technologies available in the operational systems model, impacting obsolescence of currently deployed 
technologies.  Data to support these relationships is being gathered from subject matter experts and from actual 
programs.  In some instances, however, data will need to be parameterized so that the analyst can experiment with 
different scenarios. 
The policy model includes agents that promulgate analyst-specified policies into the actor, supply chain and 
system models.  Feedback provided from these models can influence the policy agents.  For example, a policy of 
restrictive supplier qualification or severe penalties for counterfeit pass-through may result in too few suppliers or 
too much supply chain risk (e.g., sole-sourcing critical sub-systems).  If this occurs, the policy agent may loosen 
restrictions.  
Consider an example whereby counterfeiters located in a foreign country arrange importation of counterfeit 
electronics into the U.S., using untrusted importer-suppliers.  In the exogenous model, system lifespans have 
increased both in terms of acquisition time and service time.  New technology development occurs at an increasing 
rate.  Both these trends speed the obsolescence of sub-systems and components in systems under development, as 
well as fielded systems, increasing vulnerabilities to counterfeits.  At the same time, the foreign nation’s government 
has invested large quantities into state-run enterprises that manufacture semiconductors and electronics, thus 
enabling faster evolution of counterfeiter capabilities adapted from the results of this investment.  Policy alternatives 
include the following:
x Identify and close down the U.S. importers of counterfeits using law enforcement,
x Impose penalties on suppliers for passing counterfeits,
x Restrict programs to use of suppliers approved as trusted suppliers, and
x Increase the rate of testing lots from non-trusted suppliers.
If the law enforcement alternative is adopted, the counterfeiters can reconfigure their importer network, unless
they are successful in achieving a highly visible crackdown on the importers that discourages other importers.  It is 
not clear that there would be a cost implication for replacement parts.  If penalties are adopted, some suppliers will 
opt out of defense work, resulting in higher costs and less availability of replacement parts.  If use of trusted 
suppliers is adopted, programs will face higher costs for replacement parts, and some may elect to skirt the rules.  In 
both cases, counterfeits will likely be reduced.  Finally, if increased testing is adopted, costs increase due to the tests 
Exogenous Model Policy Model
DoD Operations (L&MR, SE) 
▪ Extent of criticality
▪ Extent of test 
▪ Method of tracking 
▪ Obsolescence management
DoD Policy
▪ Penalties
▪ Supplier qualification
▪ Test/tracking policies
Law enforcement
▪ Approach (incremental vs.
all-at-once)
WBS 
Supply chain 
Enterprise Actor, Supply Chain & 
Operational System Model
Actors
Constituent 
behavior
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and to quarantine and scrapping of false positives.  However, some counterfeits will still pass, since counterfeiters 
have learned how to get around sampling techniques that are designed for traditional quality control problems.  The 
goal of the model is to explore a probabilistic trade-space analysis of the effect of different policies or sets of 
policies on cost, part availability and counterfeiting incidence. 
The model is implemented in AnyLogic, using an agent-based representation for each of the sub-models except 
for the system dynamics exogenous model.  Current work involves elaborating the model implementation to account 
for additional phenomena as described in Section 3.
5. Conclusion and Future Research
This paper has presented an enterprise modeling framework for the problem of counterfeit parts in the defense 
supply chain and in defense systems.  This is an increasingly important problem driven by economics and 
geopolitics.  Since it is socio-technical in nature and involves different stakeholders and perspectives, an enterprise 
modeling approach is used, and an enterprise modeling methodology is applied.  Future work involves scoping the 
different sub-model implementations so as to ensure computational tractability, while maintaining the essential 
characteristics of the problem, including adaptive behavior and secondary effects.
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